Purpose:

The purpose of the reading group is meet and discuss classical articles, new working papers and ongoing research ideas on epistemic game theory.  

Schedule:

To be announced.

Past Meetings:    

• April 29, 2011 (Time: 13:30-15:30; Room: F0.05): Battigalli, P. & Siniscalchi, M. (2002). Battigalli, P. & Siniscalchi, M. (2002). Strong belief and forward induction reasoning. Journal of Economic Theory 106, 356-391.
• April 8, 2011 (Time: 13:30-15:30; Room: F0.04): Battigalli, P. & Siniscalchi, M. (1999). Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games. Journal of Economic Theory 88, 188-230.
• March 25, 2011 (Time: 13:30-15:30; Room: TS492.008): Perea, A. (2010). Belief in the opponents' future rationality. METEOR Research Memorandum.
• February 25, 2011 (Time: 13:30-15:30; Room: F0.09): Ben-Porath, E. (1997). Rationality, Nash equilibrium and backwards induction in perfect-information games. Review of Economic Studies 64, 23-46.
• December 3, 2010 (Time: 13:30-15:30; Room: F0.05): Brandenburger, A., Friedenberg, A. & Keissler, J. (2008). Admissibility in games. Econometrica 76, 307-352.
• November 12, 2010 (Time: 13:30-15:30; Room: E1.06): Asheim, G. (2001). Proper rationalizability in lexicographic beliefs. International Journal fo Game Theory 30, 453-478.
• October 22, 2010 (Time: 13:30-15:30; Room: E1.06): Blume, L., Brandenburger, A. & Dekel, E. (1991a). Lexicographic probabilities and choice under uncertainty. Econometrica 59, 61-79; Blume, L., Brandenburger, A. & Dekel, E. (1991b). Lexicographic probabilities and equilibrium refinements. Econometrica 59, 81-98. 
• October 1, 2010 (Time: 13:30-15:30; Room: 0.011(TS49)): Brandenburger, A. & Dekel, E. (1993). Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge. Journal of Economic Theory 59, 189-198.
• September 16, 2010 (Time: 13:30-15:30; Room: F1.11): Aumann, R.J. (1987). Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality, Econometrica 55, 1-18.
• May 31, 2010 (Time: 14:00-15:00; Room: E1.06): Perea, A. (2007). A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies, Synthese, 158, 251-271.
• May 17, 2010 (Time: 14:00-15:00; Room: E1.06): Aumann, R.J. &Brandenburger, A. (1995). Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium. Econometrica 63, 1161-1180.
• May 10, 2010 (Time: 14:00-15:00; Room: E1.06): Tan, T.C. & Werlang, S.R. (1988). The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games. Journal of Economic Theory 45, 370-391.
• May 3, 2010 (Time: 14:00-15:00; Room: E1.04): Bernheim, D. (1984). Rationalizable strategic behavior. Econometrica 52, 1007-1028; Pearce, D. (1984). Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection. Econometrica 52, 1029-1050.