## Index

agreement theorem, 209 awareness principle, 318 basis, 54 Bayesian equilibrium, 284 canonical, 289 choice optimal in a Bayesian equilibrium, 285belief, 19 correct, 135 higher-order belief, 86 independent, 132, 138 signed, 39, 43 belief hierarchy, 86 simple incomplete information, 271 psychological games, 459 standard games, 136 symmetric incomplete information, 281 psychological games, 467 standard games, 153 with incomplete information, 223 with unawareness, 320 belief in opponents' rationality in games with unawareness, 323 in psychological games, 391 in standard games, 97 with incomplete information, 227 beliefs diagram, 91 for three players, 88 for two players, 86 in psychological games, 386 weighted, 153 with incomplete information, 224 with unawareness, 321 bottom-up procedure, 338 with fixed beliefs on views, 350 bounded set, 59

canonical Bayesian equilibrium, 289 choice optimal in a canonical Bayesian equilibrium, 290 canonical correlated equilibrium, 174 choice optimal in a canonical correlated equilibrium, 175 canonical psychological correlated equilibrium, 473existence, 474 optimal choice in a canonical psychological correlated equilibrium, 474 causality diagram, 429 choice, 14 optimal, 14 randomized, 50 rational, 22 closed set. 59 common belief, 130 common belief in rationality in psychological games, 391 in standard games, 99 possibility psychological games, 416 standard games, 110 with incomplete information, 236 with unawareness, 332 sufficient condition, 100 with incomplete information, 227 with unawareness, 323 common knowledge, 130 common prior on choice combinations psychological games, 472 standard games, 173 on choice-type combinations incomplete information, 283 psychological games, 467 standard games, 159

on choice-utility combinations incomplete information, 289 communication game, 208 compact set, 188 conditional preference relation, 20 signed, 43 convex combination, 54 convex hull, 54 convex set. 54 correct beliefs, 135 correlated equilibrium, 160 canonical, 174 choice optimal in a correlated equilibrium, 162psychological, 470 correspondence, 188 decision maker, 13 decision problem in a game, 83 under certainty, 13 under uncertainty, 18, 20 Delta-rationalizability, 266 dimension, 54 dominance strict, 22 weak, 22 elimination order, 119 epistemic model for psychological games, 389 for standard games, 92 with incomplete information, 225 with unawareness, 321 equivalent choices, 22 expected utility, 24 expected utility representation, 25 fixed belief on views, 341, 344 fixed beliefs about utilities, 239 fixed point, 188 game psychological, 388 standard game, 83 with incomplete information, 219, 221 with unawareness, 314, 319 game theory, 127

generalized iterated strict dominance procedure. 231with fixed beliefs on utilities, 240 generalized Nash equilibrium, 273 existence, 274 optimal choice in a generalized Nash equilibrium, 274 hyperplane, 54 incomplete information, 219, 221 independent beliefs, 138 interim rationalizability correlated, 267 independent, 267 iterated elimination of choices and second-order expectations, 401 iterated elimination of choices and states for psychological games, 422 iterated elimination of strictly dominated choices, 106iterated expectation, 210 iterated strict dominance for unawareness, 327 with fixed beliefs on views, 346 Kakutani's fixed point theorem, 188 linear combination, 53 linear independence, 53 linear space, 53 linear subspace, 53 Nash equilibrium, 140 existence, 147 generalized, 273 optimal choice in a Nash equilibrium, 141 psychological, 460 no bet theorem, 210 no trade theorem, 209 one theory per choice condition incomplete information, 289 psychological game, 472 standard games, 172 one theory per choice-utility pair, 289 open set, 59 optimal choice, 14 for a type

incomplete information, 226 psychological game, 389 standard game, 96 unawareness, 323 order independence, 119 in standard games, 113 with incomplete information, 233, 327 and fixed beliefs on utilities, 241 with unawareness and fixed beliefs on views, 347 order of elimination, 112, 119 player, 83 preference intensity, 28 preference relation, 14 conditional, 20 transitive, 15 preference reversals, 22 probability distribution, 19 psychological correlated equilibrium, 470 canonical, 473 choice optimal in a psychological correlated equilibrium, 471 existence, 472 psychological game, 388 psychological Nash equilibrium, 460 choice optimal in a psychological Nash equilibrium, 461 existence, 466

randomized choice, 50 rational choice, 22 under common belief in rationality for psychological games, 391 in standard games, 102 with incomplete information, 228 with unawareness, 324 rationalizability, 132 reduction operator, 119 monotonicity, 119 strict dominance, 121

second-order expectation, 384, 387 separating hyperplane theorem, 59 signed belief, 39, 43 signed conditional preference relation, 43 simple belief hierarchy

incomplete information, 271 psychological games, 459 standard games, 136 span, 53 state, 19 in a game, 83 states-first procedure for psychological games, 423strict dominance, 22 by randomized choice, 50 symmetric belief hierarchy incomplete information, 281 psychological games, 467 standard games, 153 transitivity, 15 type for psychological games, 389 for standard games, 92 with incomplete information, 225 with unawareness. 321 utility, 16 expected, 24 utility design procedure for preference reversals, 37 for two choices, 31 utility difference property, 30 utility function, 16 utility representation, 16 vector, 53 view in game with unawareness, 318 rank of view, 334 smallest view, 334 weak dominance, 22 weighted beliefs diagram incomplete information, 281 psychological games, 467 standard games, 153