The purpose of the reading group is to discuss published and ongoing research on epistemic game theory and related topics.

2018

• Non-standard analysis, and its relations to decision theory and game theory, Robinson 1973, Hammond 1994, Halpern 2010, January 31.

 

Non-standard analysis extends the real numbers by including an infinitesimal, which is a positive number that is strictly smaller than any positive real number. Such an infinitesimal can be viewed as a placeholder for an infinite sequence of positive real numbers converging to zero, which is often used in game theory and decision theory to model trembles or cautious beliefs. This non-standard analysis goes back to Robinson (1973). During the meeting we intend to discuss the field of non-standard numbers, some of its main properties, its connections to lexicographic beliefs and trembles, and how it can be useful for decision theory and game theory.

 

 

2017

• Order Independence in Games, January

2015

• Dynamic Psychological Games, Battigalli & Dufwenberg 2009, May
• Static Psychological Games,  Geanakopols, Pearce and Stachetti 1989, April
• Proof Mixmin Expected Utility, Gilboa & Schmeidler 1989, March
• Maximin Expected Utility, Gilboa & Schmeidler 1989, February

2014

• Are the treasures of game theory ambiguous?, Eichberger & Kelsey 2008, November
• The Logic of Backward Induction, Aumann & Arieli 2013, October
• When do types induce the same belief hierarchy? A recursive procedure, September
• Heterogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium and Cognitive Hierarchies, Rogers, Palfrey and Camerer 2009, July
• Rational Inattention, April
• General Imaging, Lewis 1976, Gardenfors 1988, Perea 2009, February
• When do two types induce the same belief hierarchy?, Perea 2014, January

2013

• Drawing a parallel between unawareness and common knowledge, Anna Zseleva, December
• Introduction to unawareness in games II, Heifetz et al. 2006 & Heifetz et al. 2013, November
• Introduction to unawareness in games I, Modica and Rustichini 1994 & Dekel et al. 1998 October
• Completeness and Soundness of Propositional Logic II, August
• Completeness and Soundness of Propositional Logic I, June
• Zermelo and the Early History of Game Theory, Schwalbe&Walker 2001, May
• Introduction to Quantum Game Theory, Meyer 1999, April

2011

• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning, Battigalli & Siniscalchi 2002, April
• Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games, Battigalli & Siniscalchi 1999, April
• Belief in the opponents’ future rationality, Perea 2010, March
• Rationality, Nash equilibrium and backwards induction in perfect-information games, Ben-Porath 1997, February

2010

• Admissibility in games, Brandenburger, Friedenberg & Keissler 2008, December
• Proper rationalizability in lexicographic beliefs, Asheim 2001, November
• Lexicographic probabilities, Blume, Brandenburger & Dekel 1991, October
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge, Brandenburger & Dekel 1993, October
• Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality, Aumann 1987, September
• A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies, Perea 2007, May
• Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium, Aumann & Brandenburger 1995, May
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games, Tan & Werlang 1988, May
• Rationalizable strategic behavior, Bernheim 1984 & Pearce 1984, May