Video Lectures on Epistemic Game Theory
In 2013, my lectures on Epistemic Game Theory at Maastricht University have been recorded. You can watch the videos of these lectures below. The idea is that in the near future, we will offer an online course on Epistemic Game Theory, where these videos will serve as a basis.
The course is based on my textbook Epistemic Game Theory: Reasoning and Choice, which has been published in 2012 by Cambridge University Press.
Below, you find an outline of this course, and the video recordings of the lectures.
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Part I : Standard Beliefs in Static Games
Common Belief in Rationality (Based on Chapters 2 and 3 of my book)
What is game theory about
Example: Where to locate my pub
Example: Going to a party
Choosing rationally
Belief hierarchies
Epistemic model
Common belief in rationality
Existence
Algorithm
Simple Belief Hierarchies (Based on Chapter 4 of my book)
Simple belief hierarchies
Nash equilibrium
Computational method
Belief that opponents hold correct beliefs
Part II : Lexicographic Beliefs in Static Games
Primary Belief in the Opponent’s Rationality (Based on Chapter 5 of my book)
Cautious reasoning about the opponent
Lexicographic beliefs
Belief hierarchies and types
Cautious types
Primary belief in the opponent’s rationality
Common full belief in “primary belief in rationality”
Existence
Weakly dominated choices
Algorithm
Respecting the Opponent’s Preferences (Based on Chapter 6 of my book)
Respecting the opponent’s preferences
Common full belief in “respect of preferences”
Existence
Why elimination of choices does not work
Preference restrictions and likelihood orderings
Algorithm
Assuming the Opponent’s Rationality (Based on Chapter 7 of my book)
Assuming the opponent’s rationality
Common assumption of rationality
Algorithm
Part III: Conditional Beliefs in Dynamic Games
Belief in the Opponents’ Future Rationality (Based on Chapter 8 of my book)
Belief revision Dynamic games
Conditional beliefs Epistemic model
Common belief in future rationality
Algorithm Backwards order of elimination
Backward induction
Strong Belief in the Opponents’ Rationality (Based on Chapter 9 of my book)
Strong belief in the opponents’ rationality
Common strong belief in rationality
Algorithm
Comparison with backward dominance procedure