Since 2000, I have been working mainly in epistemic game theory. Epistemic game theory is not a specialization within game theory, but rather a particular way to look at game theory. The purpose of epistemic game theory is namely to model, and analyze, possible ways in which a player in a game may reason about his opponents. This reasoning process is really fundamental in game theory: before a player makes a choice in a game, he must form a belief about what his opponents will do, which in turn is based on what he believes that his opponents believe that others will do. That is, before making a choice, a player must reason about his opponents, and subsequently base his choice on this process of reasoning.

In order to fully understand the behavioral consequences of a particular way of reasoning about your opponents, it is necessary to build a formal mathematic model that precisely describes this way of reasoning.

Once such a model has been delivered, we can logically derive the choices that a player can rationally make if he follows this pattern of reasoning.

If possible, we may try to find an algorithm that computes, for a given player, all the choices he can rationally make if he follows this pattern of reasoning.

Until now, my papers in epistemic game theory are:

Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games (2005) (with Geir Asheim) (Published in Games and Economic Behavior)

Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games (2006) (Published in International Journal of Game Theory)

Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games (2007) (Published in Journal of Economic Theory)

A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies (2007) (Published in Synthese)

Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction (2008) (Published in Mathematical Social Sciences)

Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games (2009) (with Geir Asheim) (Working Paper)

Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning (2010) (Published in Games)

An algorithm for proper rationalizability (2011) (Published in Games and Economic Behavior)

Finite reasoning procedures for dynamic games (2012) (Prepared for edited volume on “Strategic reasoning in dynamic games")

Commitment in Alternating Offers Bargaining (2013) (with Topi Miettinen) (Working paper)

Agreeing to disagree with lexicographic prior beliefs (2013) (with Christian W. Bach) (Published in Mathematical Social Sciences)

Plausibility orderings in dynamic games (2014) (Published in Economics and Philosophy)

From classical to epistemic game theory (2014) (Published in International Game Theory Review, special issue on LOFT 2012)

Utility proportional beliefs (2014) (with Christian W. Bach) (Published in International Journal of Game Theory)

Belief in the opponents' future rationality (2014) (Published in Games and Economic Behavior)

A new epistemic characterization of proper rationalizability (2014) (with Souvik Roy) (Working paper)

When do types induce the same belief hierarchy? (2014) (Working paper)